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Inventing Philosophy 
Ted Cohen 
"Bw: I reckon I goc co ugh1 our for che r.eniwry aheaO. of che resc, becmue Aime Sally 
she's gomg co adopt me and sivilhe me. and 1 can 'c stand it. 1 been there before." 
American culture--0r the lack of culture in America-is sometimes thought of 
in comparative terms like these: an ordinary, educated Frenchman can be 
expected co know something of what is in Descartes and Rousseau, and he 
certainly can recognize lines from Stendahl or Flaubert; his German counterpart 
knows something of Kant, and not only can he recognize hue he can himself 
quote endlessly from Goethe and Schiller; the English version knows Locke and 
maybe MiU and Hume, and Shakespeare is in his tongue. 
But an American. What can he do? What philosophy does he know? Does he 
know Thoreau or Emerson? Maybe he knows something about "different 
drummers" or "the rude bridge that arched the flood," bur maybe noc, and he 
may not associate those things with the right authors or texts. What about the 
literature he knows? Can he get past 'Call me Ishmael'? Small wonder if he can't 
remember past char because probably he never read past that if he has read 
Melville at all. 
But our documents, one might say, are not those philosoph.ical and literary 
ones. Our texts are our foundational documents, our scriptuTe, one mighc say, 
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. But what does the ordinary, 
educated American know of those works, reallyr Our last President has shown 
more than once chac he does not know which document is which, that the 
location of the "Bill of Rights" and 'inalienable rights' and the stuff about "life, 
liberty, and the pursuic of happiness" is noc clear to him. And I would guess thac 
che former President is not an atypical American in this regard. Who is our 
Descartes or Rousseau or Locke or Kant? Which words stand for us like 
Shakespeare's or Goethe's? And if we have none, how can we have a culture? 
How can we have a philosophy? 
This schematic comparison of Americans with Western Europeans is exagger; 
aced, of course. I know that. The French don't reaHy understand Descartes. 
Some Germans thought they were conducting the Holocaust in the name of 
Kant. Some Englishmen think that the Magna Cana guarantees chem a righc to 
one phone call when they've been arrested. So the crude comparison of Ameri; 
can culture with that of Western Europe sounds dissonanti brut I chink it iis in the 
right key none the less. 
We ordinary, educated Americans are not cultural illiterates, and yet, I 
daresay, we are more likely to have King Lear in common than The Bear (and we 
are likely to take Dickens more seriously than Mark Twain), and when we know 
a philosopher it is much more likely to be Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, 
Kane, or Marx, than, say, Peirce, Dewey, or Thoreau. That is to say that the 2
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textual culture we ma� Seem co han:. m ttfcct LS the culcure ot \X,'e c�m Euwpe. 
But that 1_s not exactly ours, and we don't rt:ally po- e-... 1c m common; and that 
seems to leave us Wlth nothing. 
There 1s a European asse menc of Amenca which h!gm� wlrh a ·en e {hac 
mdeed Americans have nothing, no culture or trad1non nch �nough ro -uppvn: 
us as s1gnificant historical people. Tuts asse menr give nse co rwo pec1fic 
charges, wh1ch are the most common negath'e remarks I hear abouc America: 
1. Americans are politically naive. They have no clear international po ition 
and hence no discernible consistent foreign policy. And rhey ha,·e no dome tic 
socialistic influence, no political left, which leaves their national policies simplis· 
tic. 
2. Americans are crudely materialistic. They are bent on the acquisicion of 
wealth for the purpose of buying indiscriminately and "'1thouc casre. Those 
without weallth are made to feel guilty on that account, and among che 
unprivileged this creates great resentment and envy which frequently erupt in 
violence. 
This is not my place co quarrel with these charges. (In face I accept them: I 
virtually embrace them.) But it was recently the year of che Corutirntion, after all, 
and so l will take one rhecorical moment and ask your indulgence as I note that 
these charges come from what ought to be an uneasy smugness. 
We Americans are politically naive. Who says so? Who orchestrated the 
battle of che Somme, the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, and the horror of Belfast? 
What polirical sophisticates did rhose things? How did all chose poor Poles who 
fled their country for England in the l 930's and l 940's, and then fought for 
Britain, wind up being slaughtered by Stalin? Would it have been unsophisti, 
cated to save them? 
The rampant and random violence that haunts American cities results from 
America's naive domestic politics combined with our unbridled materialism. We 
are uncivilized. Of course the loss of life in Europe has been infinitely greater, 
occurring in and around the areas of two large·scale wars-but that is different, 
more sophisticated politically. 
The French have discovered chat colonialism is moraUy wrong and politically 
incorrect, as have the English. These sophisticated realiz:ations, these evolutions 
in political consciousness which outstrip American primitivism, have occurred, 
providentially enough, just as all chose colonies were being lost. Noc quite all. le 
was correct, evidently, for the French to leave Algeria and Indochina� and for 
the English to leave India; but it would be naive to think that the English should 
leave the Malvinas {we Americans do not have to say 'Falklands'). 
There is a difficulty in West Germany, of late, caused by the influx of immi, 
grant workers. Did you know that in Germany this difficulty is sometimes called 
'the Turkish problem'? In that piece of technical political terminology, and in the 
recent Austrian presidential politics known as Waldheimer's Disease, there is 
political sophistication that makes my blood run cold. 
I don't feel especially good saying all those things, but it does relieve me co get 
them out. And that will be just about the end of it. Thank you for the time it 
took to read it, and for putting up with whatever offense it gave. 
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lnwncmg Plulosoph)· 1 
Let me gee back co rhe rheme. America is "ichout an identifiable rexcual 
culture, where tlus means that there are no old . ..\merican books which resonate 
m che work of contemporary Americans when we wnre our philosoph ·. If I am 
permitted a far,fecched comparison, l might say chat when we philosophize we 
are like Catholics wuhout a dergv. or, even more. like Jews withouc the Talml«l. 
Perhaps our condition is like that described in the Hebrew Bible ac the verv end 
of che book of )iulges: 
In chose days there was no king m Israel: every man did chat which 
was right in his own eyes. 1 
How do you hear that line? Does it sound to you like a descrip:cion of events and 
nothing more? Does it seem to have a negative thrust? Was it bad that there was 
no king in Israel? Listen again: 
In chose days there was no king in Israel: every man did chat which 
was right in his own eyes. 
One might hear an awful hopelessness in that line, a desperate, unremitcing 
anxiecy. The book of Judges is in Christian Bibles as well, but often it is placed 
differently there. In the Hebrew Bible it is followed immediately by the books of 
Samuel and Kings, and chese are the books which record the subsequent history 
of the kings of Israel. Near the end of that history we read this: 
Therefore the Lord spoke through His servants the prophets: 
'Because King Manasseh of Judah has done these abhorrent things­
he has outdone in wickedness all that the Amorites did before his 
time-and because he led Judah to sin with his fetishes, assuredly, 
thus said che Lord, the God of Israel: I am going to bring such a 
disaster on Jerusalem and Judah that both ears of everyone who 
hears about it will tingle. I will apply to Jerusalem the plumb line of 
Samaria and the weights of the House of Ahab; I will wipe Jerusa, 
lem clean as one wipes a dish and turns it upside down. And I will 
case off the remnant of My own people and deliver them into the 
hands of their enemies. They shall be plunder and prey to all their 
enemies because they have done what is displeasing to Me and have 
been vexing Me from the day that their fathers came out of Egypt to 
this day.2 
Is this a better fate than living without a king? Perhaps those people might have 
had better luck with kings. Indeed they did have some good kings. There were 
Saul, David, and Solomon, and much later there was Josiah who was a wonder 
but came when it was too late for anyone to redeem Judah from Manasseh's 
depredations. Bue Saul himself was a mistake, wasn't he? God gave them Saul, 
but He was annoyed that they demanded a king. 
If that final line from Judges sounds to you as if it is describing an intolerable 
4
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situation, then ic should sound co you like a tcmble line, hecauS<:! it 1gnal thac 
there is no good way to go. Perhaps the current race of I ·rad can be under ctxxf 
in this way. Those people were not meanc to be a nanon like other natiom. 
God showed as much when Ht showed disapprnncmenc alC their JemanJ for a 
king. But when they were noc a nauon chev were dead. What are we w do! 
Well. nothing entitle me co lumber you wich amaceur Bible-reading and 
speculauons upon che hiscory of Jews m the modem world; so let me g�c back w 
the theme and cry co stay with it. 
Those who think chat without a kmg we cannor be like other nations are like 
those who think that without a textual philosophical tradition we cannm have a 
philosophical culture like chose of Europe. Those who chink that are exactly 
righc about their point, but they miss che larger point. We cannot have a 
philosophical culture-a tradition-like that of Britain or France or Germany 
without texcs like Hume or Descartes or Kam; bur who is, co say that we can 
have no philosophy unless we have philosophy like that? 
Those who want an American philosophical cradicion recognizably like chose 
of Europe would like Thoreau or Emerson or Dewey or James co be our philo­
sophical scripture, che fount of our philosophy. The mosr obvious choice for 
such a position, probably, is a group of texts called che works of Pragmatism, an 
amalgam of things by Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, and a piece or rwo of Tarski's. 
Bue even with chat choice the project won't work. Ac lease I chink it won't. We 
could establish Pragmatism as the preeminent American school, and then 
American philosophers will develop as Pragmatists, Neo-Pragmaciscs, Tarskian 
Pragmatists, Early Pragmatiscs, Unreconstructed Pragmaticists, &c .• rather like 
the Young Hegelians, Neo-Kantians, Marburg Kanrians, Alchusserian Marxists, 
Gramscian Marxists, Structuralists, Neo-Srructuraliscs, Deconstructionists, &c. 
of modem Europe. If we do chat we will do what Cary Grant does in North by 
Northwest when he rries to become an American by joining up with a European­
scyle spy who calls himself an American. J 
Our most neglected first-class thinker and writer is Thoreau (probably, unless 
it is Jefferson or Emerson). Thoreau thought Americans needed a scripture and 
he aspired to give us one in Walden. But Thoreau did nor see that we could not 
take the book, or any book, as that kind of scripture. When I write I may think 
of the chapter in Walden called 'The Bean Field'. It is the pare of Walden in 
which Thoreau meditates upon what it means for an American to write for 
American readers, and in particular what it means for Thoreau himself to be 
writing Walden for an American audience (an audience Thoreau thinks unborn 
when he writes). But I don't have to think of that, and certainly I don't have to 
suppose that you will read what I write with •'The Bean Field" in mind, and no 
American author can or ever will suppose that Thoreau will be widely heard to 
resonate in his work. Perhaps a German author cannot escape the sorrows of 
young Werther, but American writing is not like chat. 
What Thoreau does not see is that if Walden were accepted in the way he 
hoped, it would amount to a kind of Europeanization of American culture. It 
would be un�American to accept it in that way. We do not have to read and 
write with Walden or the Pragmatists in our ears. As Cary Grant says to the 
5
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lm.'mcmg Philosoph�· 9 
Europeanced American spv master. ··;..:olx)j,· has t) do an ·rhmg!" Then whac 
are we American phiJosophers to do? Be{ re 1 �av somerhmg about one rhing we 
mighr do. lee me disclaim a few thing·. 1 am noc a king Europeans to stop 
malang crincal observation� of Amenca, nor Americans to leave off discu. ·ing 
Europe and tts texrs. That kind of insularity is cempting, and the cemptarion has 
never found beccer expression than in che words of an American ja:.: musician. 
I don't see why we need a Frenchman to come over here and tell us 
how co play American music. I wouldn't think of going to France 
and celling him how ro Jump on a grape.� 
Thar's funny, yes, and one mighc even feel like saying good for Eddie Condon, 
but in general there is no good reason co be reluctant to hear European assess­
ments. They are nor all smug and negative. For instance, less than cen years 
before Eddie Condon 's obser\'arion, in Vienna Wittgensrein said this: 
What should be given to the Americans? Surely not our half-rotten 
culture. The Americans have no culture yet. From us, however, 
they have nothing to leam.5 
What I want to urge is chat an American philosopher might have a vocation 
without eicher continuing or imitating European models, but surely that does not 
forbid Americans and Europeans from absorbing and appraising one another's 
efforts. le may be irksome when some European assesses American culture and 
philosophy, but I find it far less troublesome than when the same thing is done by 
an American who speaks co us about America in a European idiom. l am 
thinking of the glib prattle and knowing weariness of American academic 
Marxists, for instance, or the pronouncements upon "analytical philosophy" 
made by American sycophants and epigones of French literary theory who are 
themselves utterly unable, say, to work their way through the first-order predi­
cate calculus and consequently have absolutely no idea what they are talking 
about when they talk about Quine or Carnap or Davidson. That Derrida or Paul 
de Man should be completely ignoram of these things is not exactly excusable, 
but it is not obviously shameful. as it is when some American arc theorist 
discusses the logical theory of reference, because all she has ever needed co do 
was step across the hall and ask some American philosopher co explain the 
theory to her. 
One last disclaimer. When I have charted the geography of North by North­
west I have said that America is both a state and a state of mind, certainly nor a 
new idea with me. The same conception is at work here. I am going to describe 
a kind of philosophy and I will say why it seems to me a peculiarly American 
kind of philosophy; but there is no reason why Europeans cannot practice it, and 
there is no reason why an American philosopher cannot work in traditional 
European modes. In fact the kind of philosophy I will be describing was prac­
ticed at its best, if not invented, by an Englishman, J. L. Austin. It is the ktnd of 
philosophy that was once called 'ordinary language philosophy', and I am going 
6
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to present it to you along with America's .. orJmarv art." the mO\'te . 
One topic of this essay-a kind of �crec topic noc earned m th� mle-is 
what is, on my view, the striking simjlamy bern·een the ascendancv of Ordman· 
Language Philosophy and the advent of the movie . The excraorJinan· appeal of 
this kind of philosophy (to professional academics and all ocher cuJenc� of 
philosophy), and of movies (to almost everyone, it seemed, and e\'enrually �ven 
co those who meant co reserve their deepest feelings for Art), was Jue. in p�rc. ro 
their capacities ro restore connections with the ordinary. This theme has ar lea c 
three variations char I know of, each of chem \\'Orth a monograph or rwo, anJ I 
will just state them roughly and settle for a very partial developmenc. 
I. The well known but Little understood capacity of movies to deal \\.ith 
ordinary, common, even pedestrian things., and the way in which chis capacity 
seems to have been able co do the work of the high artistic traditions rypically 
standing behind work in other ans. 
2. The curious face that at some times for some people an authentic apprecia, 
tion of the finest movies has been grounded in a deep affecrion for all movies, or 
ac lease for very many movies of no particular apparenc artistic strength. 
3. The wish char was satisfied by some of the best ordinary language philoso, 
phy, namely chat philosophical language reflect without distortion language in its 
ordinary use. 
My generation's complete absorption in movies was achieved, roughly, in four 
stages. The first stage was virtually unconscious. We had all gone to movies 
regularly as children, and chey were a constant part of our lives, but masc of us 
had just enjoyed them and had noc associated them wich arc in any particular 
sense. When we became acquainted with art in a conscious and self,conscious 
way, we never thought that it had anything to do with movies. The choughc 
literally never occurred co us. For us, art was essentially a European phenom, 
enon, with a few-very few-American authors and painters mixed in, and the 
movies belonged with pop music, drag racing, and going co baseball games. In 
college we learned co take on serious things and movies didn't come along. 
The second stage was occupied with three moviemakers, as I remember.6 The 
movies of Bergman, fuse, and then of Godard and T ruffaut appeared for the first 
rime in America when I was in college. Bergman was the key figure. The Seventh 
Seal appeared immediately to virtually any viewer as serious and wrapped in 
artistic pretension. The themes, life and religion, death and salvation, are deep 
and obscure. The plot exhibits an obvious and intense dramatic structure. And 
there is real acting, immediately reminiscent of closely coached, long practiced 
repertory theatre. In addition to all this, one's sense that this movie was 
inescapably Art was fortified by what looked to be, and was, its lineage: a 
European ancestry: the soul of Scandinavian literature had carried over intact 
into the movies. 
The effect of Bergman was two,sided. Initially his movies strengthened a 
preconception of what movies are and what the best ones would have to be like, 
for exactly those qualities found wanting in American movies were presented 
brilliantly by Bergman. Here was a moviemaker who cared about acting and 
story composition and even set design. But at the same time, more immediately 
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and direcrlv. Bergman's nh.wte� esraHished a pasmon ti.)r mo\"les m general. They 
c"mld no longer so easily be raken lighch· or dismiss�d our of hand. lndh·idual 
m0,;es were now going w be taken singly. more openl ·and ingenul,uslv. with 
rheoreucal conceptions ac lease m abe ·ance. It was nm that a new taste or 
scnsibiliry had been elicited. Indeed when rhar tlnallv occurred the Bergman 
m0,;es rhemseh·es would suffer for 1r. But 1c was now possible tor chis co come 
abouc. for now Wt! were read�· co pay attention: w rry to understand, to let the 
demands be placed on us instead of setting them for the movies.i 
In chis mood we encountered Godard and Truffaut. The effect was bewilder­
ing and exhilarating. Those who had been impressed by The S�>erith Seal and 
"Xt"ild Scrau·berria were now struck by they knew nm what. The conception of 
che primacy and centrality of the theatre for movies, so recently reinforced by 
Bergman, was shaken. After Bergman's troupe of players, Seberg and Belmondo 
were nearly incomprehensible. Were they acting badly? Belmondo seemed not 
robe acting at all, or not in any recognizable way. As much as anything he 
seemed co be acring at acting: he undertook not a role but Humphrey Bogart. 
What then had Bogan given us in chose American movies we had forgotten? 
That led us, and still leads us, to wondering what acting in movies is. But let me 
get on with this story. 
Godard's Brear.hless and Truffaut's The 400 Blows were stupefying. They 
confounded precisely those demands and expectations Bergman had satisfied, 
but these movies touched us. And that left us without theories. They were to 
come. There would be reflections on how these movies could have worked, 
theories of a "new cinema," and, of course, there would appear sects of inside 
specialists. Bue for the momem there was nothing but a kind of miracle, the 
phenomenon of making sense of a thing whose sense is unaccountable. It was, 
one might say, the experienc,e of art. 
The next stage was the one that intellectuals always force upon themselves. 
We curned instinctively to theory and began to read, and we found Cahiers du 
Cinema. The initial effect of that experience was incomprehensible. We had 
some acquaintance with movies of Ophuls, Bun.el, Visconti, and others whose 
movies were shown by the local film society (which also showed what it called 
'documentary films'), and we supposed that Godard and Truffaut and Bergman 
belonged with these European moviemakers, and that, as always, Europe was 
making the an while America was making Hollywood garbage, for this was how 
we thought about those American movies from our childhood local theatres. 
But in Cahiers we found T ruffaut, Godard, Bazin, Rehmer, and Chabrol extolling 
the work of John Ford, Howard Hawks, Nicholas Ray, George Cukor, and 
Hitchcock. We found stunning, magnificent remarks like this, 
I am willing to forgive my fellow�countrymen for the mistrust with 
which they view American cinemai a mistrust I myself once 
shared .... And then came the day when, in the shape of Claudette 
Colbert and Clark Gable, the cinema held up to me, under the 
most favourable lighting, a face without artifice, unpolished but 
not rough. It spoke to me in a language that was open, yet 
8
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without a hint of coarseness in its cone. le behaved hke the most 
civilized of crearmes, yer without dimirushing any of its narura1 
ness. It touched, not my schoolboy's heart with its ardour for 
Gide or Breton, buc that innace tasce chat we French never lose 
for a momenc-beyond all changes of fashion-�or the art of the 
moraJisr.b 
Clark Gable and Claudecte Colbert? Frank Capra? Ir Happened One Night? The 
work of a moralise! The theses of rhese wonderfully elaced Frenchmen were nor 
so clear, but the mere fact that not only Eric Rohmer but even Francois T ruffaut, 
the maker of Jules and Jim, cared for these American movies was enough co send 
us back to them. 
The recovery of what had always been in our theatres and had entertained us 
as children was the lase major accomplishmenc in the development of our 
appreciation. To do that we had to learn to do new chings, or, racher, co undo 
some old ones: co see John Wayne, or perhaps char is co se,e the Ringo Kid, but it 
is not to see john Wayne enact the role of the Ringo Kid; to move with the 
movie instead of the story, to accept che camera's delineations and innuendoes 
instead of on1y those of dialogue and ploc. le had been easy to feel the force of 
Bergman's celling us of a man who is a magician precisely because he knows char 
he has no magic. It was harder-and certainly different-to come to feel the 
moral judgment Hitchcock passes in Rear Window, for Hitchcock uses the movie 
itself to do this, to trap us, to make us watch a watcher and feel for him. What 
was required for this was a shift in what is taken as merely technical, mere 
virtuosity, and what is not.9 
The final stage in my generation's acquisition of movies occurred with 
American movies and this is no accident. What these movies so conspicuously 
lack is the declared presence of artistic background so prominent in various non­
American movies of that time and earlier. Buniel, for instance, with his 
Picasso-dream black bulls, his compositions direct from Dali, his innocent but 
omnipresent and ominous children, and his menacing beggars,minus,parts, 
makes sense to anyone familiar with Magritte, de Chirico, and Surrealism in 
general. Viscomi and Max Ophuls, like Bergman, appear working out of estab, 
lished traditions. These traditions, sometimes of the theatre, sometimes of 
painting, appear in the composition of individual shots, che duration of scenes, 
and the transitions from shot to shot. There seem to be no traces of these 
resources in ford and Hawks. There is no obtrusive exhibition or even an overt 
indication of these things, and there appears a much greater reliance on the 
capacity of real things, when shown, to hold the attention of a viewer-moun, 
tains, horses. tomahawks, plain faces. One's first guess may have been that to 
work, these real things will have to be spectacular things, like mountains, sunsets 
at sea, Russian faces in dialectical throes-the kinds of things that appear in 
David Lean's movies. But when one looks one sees that this isn't so. Spectacular 
things can be fine, but ordinary ones will do, and often just as well and some, 
times better. Sometimes ordinary things become special, as they appear freed of 
dramatic conventions and painterly constraints, and are just screened. Why it is 
9
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m American movtes chat chese disctwene.!> are made is a good copic which I must 
leave alone. le muse have ro do \\ith the {pre umed) absence of a consciousnt!ss 
of high art in the makers of chese mo,·ie and in their pre�umpti\'e audience. and 
ir lS in America where chis presumption prevails-but I will say no more about 
chat. 
Every significant work of arc, every am,·ork chat u-orks, attaches co its signtfi, 
cance by way of some convention, or a style, or a rradition-some framework, l)r 
context. le may repose in chis, frame or struggle against it or even burst it, but 
without che frame there could be no sense. As I think of the story of movies. rhe 
importance of ordinary things, of what Panofsky has called 'unsrylued physical 
realicy' (although Panofsky may not have been alert to every '"sryle "). was 
prefigured by the absence of any antecendently given way of beginning with 
extraordinary things. That is, there was no prior context, no tradition, and 
especially not in America. Leaming co film, to film anything at all and hence the 
absolutely unexrraordinary, was the creation of a context and not the adaptation 
of one already at hand. This begins to account for che fact-at least l think it is 
a fact-that the full appreciarion of a fine movie,, of L'Avveruura or Jules and Jim 
or GTarul Illusion or Chinawwn or North b-)· Northu>eSt, is tied co the appreciation 
of pedestrian movies, while the appreciation of great music or painting is not 
similarly tied to appreciation of, or even acquaintance with mundane exercises. 
No doubt the appreciation of fine movies is likelier to be accompanied by 
acquaintance with ordinary movies than is the appreciation of fine painting to be 
accompanied by acquaintance with ordinary painting-just as a matter of fact, 
because of the omnipresence of movies in our experience. That is nm the point. 
The claim is that with movies the appreciation of the fme is not merely accom, 
panied by, but is dependent on the experience of the ordinary. This claim is a 
(perhaps unwarranted and unwanted) amplification of some remarks made a few 
years ago by Stanley Cavell: 
The movie seems naturally to exist in a state in whiclh its highest 
and its most ordinary instances artract the same audience 
(anyway until recently) .... [M]y claim is that in the case of films, 
it is 'generally true that you do not really like the highest 
instances unless you also like typical ones. You don't even know 
what the highest are instances of unless you know the typical as 
weu.10 
For some time I have found Cavell's claim powerfully suggestive, but now that I 
have found a way to develop it I think that my development may be foreign to 
Cavell's intentions. For one thing, I do not know how to explain the relation 
between liking something and knowing what kind of thing it is, and I do not 
know how Cavell would explain the relation. To know that x is an instance of y 
you would have to know generally about the instantiation of y, I suppose, and 
certainly you would have to be able to recognize typical instances of ":J, wouldn't 
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you? That seems logical. But whv couldn't you hke x alone among the instancl!s 
of y? There is no logical objecaon to that possibility, is there! If the relation 
between liking x and liking other, typical instances of"'! LS nm a logical relanon, 
then what is it? Cavell's words suggest that it is, perhaps, a natural relation. Bue I 
doubt that Cavell would like to oppose logic to nature. And I am suspteious of 
the distinction until it is clear what is supposed co follow. ls there no connection 
between knowing and liking? Could you know whac movies are and noc like 
Grand Illusion ? Could you know what movies. are and not like any movies ac 
all-not even one! Could you know what art is and not like any art you've ever 
seen! Or: could you lilc.e a movie and not know that it is a movie? Of course you 
can do all these things--knowing without Liking, liking without knO\.\'ing-so far 
as logic is concerned. 
Bue if you do these things you will be very peculiar, even pathological, one 
might say. In some central kinds of cases-an is one, people are another-liking 
and knowing do not separate so cleanly. I do not think you can know what 
people are and never care for any of them, for without caring for at least some 
you cannot realJy come co know any of chem. And when you like a person 
without reference co his being a person, that is a severely arcenuated affection. 
Movies have required affection, I chink, for there was nothing in place to count 
as our knowledge of movies, and chat is noc so bad when it is good co make a new 
beginning. 
Music and painting must have their origins, too, one supposes. Panofsky 
thinks that the difference between movies and what he calls 'the other represen­
tational arts' is thar movies originated wich a cechnical capacity only later co be 
joined by an appropriate aesthetical motivation, whereas the others began with 
an artistic urge in need of some technical means. That is not my point. My 
point is that, speaking conceptually, or perhaps I should say "phenomenologi­
cally," the origin and subsequent evolution of other arts is out of time and out of 
mind for us: we need not refer co these origins in the act of appreciating the 
highest instances of music and painting. The point in music or painting, the 
reason why there is any, is not at the surface of our apprehension of music and 
painting. There is instead a given tradition, a history, and somehow that is 
enough. This is not given for movies. Instead of an entrenched tradition, 
coming to us from prehistory, which we have somehow been able to absorb from 
experience confined to the highest instances, we have our experience of and 
fondness for just plain movies. Perhaps, whatever Panofsky thinks, it was once, a 
million years ago in a different aesthetical world, like that with painting. But it is 
not like that with painting now and it has recently been like that with movies. 
So much for this fact, as I see it-the dependence of fine movies on ordinary 
ones, and some account of the fact-the absence of an entrenched "internalized" 
tradition upon which movies could depend. Now, finally, I will try co connect 
this account of the state of movies with the condition of philosophy as it might 
be understood by one who would be an American ordinary language philosopher. 
Think of what it is like, or would be like, to take up some technical philoso· 
pher fresh. If you push your students or yourself fresh into, say, Tarski or Carnap 
or Quine or Kant or Frege, you meet an emptiness. These texts don't make 
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�· One understands the words well enough, and one can identify the 
srructures of argumenc. But the texts don't resonate. I am not talking about the 
way you and I now read Kant and Quine: I am talking abour the way we first 
read them, or the way it would be if they were the fust philosophers we'd ever 
read. It might be relatively clear what these texts are saying, but it will be less 
clear wiry they speak in the ways they do (and so it won'r really be altogether 
clear just what they are saying). and it will be nearly i�ible to understand 
why they are speaking, for it will be nearly incomprehensible why anyone would 
care co speak about r.luu. I don't mean that one won't, simpl�· and literally, 
undersumd, but that one won't appreciate. 
When you are in chis position and care to go on, or when you push your 
studencs on, there are two ways to do it. Either way. you must somehow fix the 
serting in which this text is to be animated. You may try co do this either by 
referring to the text's heritage, its generating ancestt)', or by making the text 
speak directly co you about what you know you care about. The first way is co 
look behind Kant to Hume, Leibniz, and the rest, or behind Quine to classical 
Vienna Positivism. The second is to read the text as if it were speaking your own 
non-technical language. At least in writing about them, this is the way in which 
Austin reads Descartes, Berkeley, Ayer, and Wisdom. This is not simply reading, 
nor is it simple. It is exceptionally artful reading. It is the same master art which 
Austin deploys in the construction of examples. In fact the reading sometimes 
consists of supplying examples which make philosophical theses devastatingly 
concrete. In the movies of Hawks, and Ford, similarly, it is not that there was no 
composing before shooting. I meant that those movies look or can look that way. 
le is not that they are artless, but that they appear artless; and it takes maTVelous 
art to establish that appearance. It is the same art which makes the ordinary real 
chings look like that, bodying themselves forth. This is art whose power it is to 
render the ordinary compelling. This is the art which Austin practiced, of which 
he was a master without peer. It can seem ingenuous, natural, and easy to 
establish the ordinary force of language by making up examples of its common­
place use. But it is sublimely difficult. 
A strain of ordinary language philosophy insisted exclusively on this se,cond 
way of reading, reading as if the text were speaking "ordinary language." I ts 
proponents may have avoided the first way because they thought it looks back to 
bankrupt or evil beginnings, or they may have done it therapeutically, or 
mindlessly, out of ignorance. This is not my concern. I am concerned wilth the 
constructive reason for going the second way, for making the text speak to you. 
If a philosopher, say Descartes or Kant, tells us about knowledge, say, and 
what he says nowhere fits our concept of knowledge and everywhere militates 
against our ordinary use of the word 'know', then how can he have told us about 
knowledge? How wtll we have understood what he is talking about? Perhaps he 
would tell us that he doesn't care whether his account matches our usual use of 
4kn.ow', that he is free to use that word and philosophize around it as he likes. 
No doubt. But then how are we to understand why he expects us to be inter­
ested? He said, or so we thought, that he was talking about knowledge. Do we 
still believe him? Did he know whether he was talking about knowledge? Why 
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does he caJl thas thing he as talking about 'knowledge'? �ow perhaps he cell u 
that we are simply ignorant, thac knowledge has been d&us.sed m chis wav for 
centuries, at least since Plato, and that we ought t0 know thac, that havmg thal 
background is prerequisite for really understandmg lum. ThLS may explain 
perfectly well why we need co know Descartes if we are co understand Kane-an 
some class in the hi.scory of ideas or in che htStory of philosophy; but what reason 
is left for reading either Descartes or Kane? What 1£ we are committed co a direcc 
engagemenc-a philosophical conversation, or any kind of conversation-with 
this text, and we don't wane to animate the text artificially by placing it on a 
genealogical tree? That was the fuse way of dealing with the text. 
We are committed not to go the first way with movies once we've seen char 
they are not lcinds of pajntings or plays or whatever, because chere is no fuse way 
to go. What great movies once had to do, since chey could not assume that we 
had absorbed some high tradition, was to play upon our sense of movies in 
general: the sensibility they required was a common sense. 
My suggestion is that ordinary movies stand co movies' highest instances 
somewhat as ordinary language (and what it is about) stand to philosophical 
language (and whatever it is about). 
There is no critical canon for movies, or at least there was none, in the recem 
past. And a c  that time movies afforded us a way of getting in touch wi'ch art 
directly, as I'm suggesting that ordinary language affords us a direct connection. 
We were once drawn co the movies and lived with chem without knowing they 
were Arr. There seems no way to approach Sophocles without Aristotle's 
Poetics, no way co approach Durer without Panofsky, no way to approach T. S. 
Eliot without T. S. Eliot, no way to approach Webern without aU the help you 
can gee. But you can go straight to the movies. 
In ordinary language philosophy, or, as it once was called, in 'Oxford analysis', 
one went co work on problems of obvious intrinsic and human interest, without 
especially caring whether that was Philosophy. One can feel in one's soul the 
problem of our knowledge of other minds, or one might infuse it from Ochello, 
without fuse being indoctrinated in its importance, or, like J.  L. Austin, take up 
the topic of excuses without first finding it in a philosophical encyclopedia. 
What I am suggesting is a philosophical practice which is a kind of perpetual 
rebirth, a continuing innocence. It is not the only way to philosophize, but it isa 
way and it seems to me an especially American way. It amounts to starting over, 
always, every time, taking nothing for granted, assuming nothing about the 
salience of the problems we are working on or the efficacy of any traditional 
11method." It is one way of doing what Austin had in mind when he said 
Using, then, such a method, it is plainly preferable to investigate 
a field where ordinary language is rich and subtle, as it is in the 
pressingly practical matter of Excuses, but certainly is not in the 
matter, say, of Time. At the same time we should prefer a field 
which is not too much trodden inta bogs or tracks by traditional 
13
Cohen: Inventing Philosophy
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1990
lm1t.'1umg Philo.soph) 17 
philosophy. for in chat case e\'en 'ordinary' language will often 
ha\'e become infec ced \\ith the jargon of extinct theories. and our 
own prejudices coo. as the upholders or imbibers of theoretical 
,;ews, -will be too readily and often insensibly. engaged. Here coo. 
Excuses form an admirable topic: we can discuss at least clumsi­
ness. or absence of mind, or inconsiderateness. even spontane­
ousness, withouc remembering what Kant thought, and so 
progress by degrees even co discussing deliberation without tor 
once remembering Ariscotle or self-control \\ithouc Placo .. . .  How 
much it is co be wished that similar field work will soon be 
undertaken in. say, aesthetics; if only we could forget for a while 
about the beautiful and get down instead co the dainry and the 
dumpy. 1 1  
This may sound easy, buc it is not. l e  is very, vef)' difficult. l e  is perilous and it is 
exhausting. The peril: you may choose a topic which cums out to yield no 
riches. There is no guarancee that thinking about the dumpy will gee us any· 
where. It is easier to go for the topic of Knowledge or Beauty or 
Jus1rice-· somerhing sanctioned in advance as a Philosophical Topic. And even if 
the topic is a rich one. our efforts may gee us nothing. It is safer co sign orn to 
some method or program already licensed: do a Kantian Critique of something 
Kant didn't get to, do a Marxist analysis of bourgeois conceptions of justice in 
lace capitalist society with special acrencion to the advertisements for American 
Express Gold Cards, join the Davidson program and do a Tarskian analysis of 
compound adverbial forms of English, work on alternative lexical orderings of 
Rawlsian goods, or Deconstrucc the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
I have nothing against those programs and methods, nor those historically 
sanctified problems. But how about trying something new, something brand 
spanking new, a problem you feel and didn't have to be indoctrinated in the 
importance of; and how about going to work on the problem with no particular 
assumptions and jusc thinking abouc ic as hard as you can. If chis were one's steady 
philosophical diet it would be as if one had to invent the world again every day. 
Exhausting. Yes. But as the man said, 
.. .  Solitary, singing in the West, I strike lip for a New World. 
le takes faith to do chat, and energy, certainly, and maybe even foolhardiness. 
But che promise of America is not something for nothing; it is more like every· 
ching for everything. 
We must have examples, but for now I will give just a part of one, a begin, 
ning. 
A friend says that he does not care for baseball. He finds Et boring. In fact he 
says it is boring. Here are two things co work on: 
l .  This friend says that baseball is boring. Another friend says that Bach is 
boring. Whac's the difference? ls it more noble to be bored by baseball than to 
be bored by Bach? Does the friend who likes Bach display better taste than the 
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one who likts baseball? Why? What doc likmg Bac h ho" ah.,ut chat in�nJ'-. 
personality? His sensibiliry? Are chese chmg Jifferenr from what � hown al'x,ut 
the personality, sensibihcy, &c of the friend who like bebeball: 
And chen, what docs ic how about you chat e1cher l>f these pcl>ple is. vour 
&iend! How can someone be your fnenJ who Joesn'c like ba�hall-wor�. wh,, 
finds baseball bormg? If he not only finds b<beball bonng, but ay that he lS 
bored? Says it to you? Could he be your fnend if he did nor like Bach! CoulJ 
someone be your friend who did not like anythmg chat ·ou like? WoulJ he chen 
just like you? 
2. Lee u.; look more deeply ac the poor soul who says chat baseball is boring. 
Suppose we ask him, either, what he means by saying chac baseball is bormg. or 
what is boring about baseball (these are not quice the same question, as Austin 
would be eager for us to realize). Suppose he cells us that baseball is not exciting 
or that it is seldom exciting. Does he mean chat he himself does not ofren gee 
excited when watching baseball? We may already have known char: char seems 
co be another way of saying, almost, what he said when he made his first and 
unforgiveable remark about baseball. No, he means that the game itself is not 
exciting. But why? Because not much happens. But what counts as something 
happening! When he goes for a drive in the country, a stroll in the woods, a hike 
in the hills, nothing much happens. Is he bored then? Oh but those outings are 
different, he says, because baseball is a sport, like football and soccer and tennis. 
Bue in what ways is baseball Ulce football and soccer and tennis? If you go to a 
baseball game looking for the kinds of things that "happen" in football, you won'l 
find many. Bur why do you go looking in char way? When you listen ro Bach do 
you set your feet a-tapping and soon begin to clap your hands and dance? Does 
Bach's music disappoint you because it doesn't help you do those things? 
But Bach's music is arc, and baseball is not. What does that mean? What is 
the point in a remark like that? That question is the one I would like co answer 
when I take up 11the very idea of arc," and when I do, I will begin by asking why 
anyone would ever care to say char something is or isn't art. 
1 )1"1ges, 2 1 .25. 
1 II Ki11gs. 2 l. 10-15. 
Notes 
I chink this Hitchcodc movie is. among other things, an argumentative meditation 
on what ic means to be an American. I have made a case for this way of seeing the 
movie in "North by Northwest: The Face of America, 11 the first in a series of three 
leccurers I was privileged to deliver ac the College of William and Mary in 1987. 
The series was called "An Idea of America." The second lecture was the beginning 
of the essay princed here. 
4 This poignanc remark is acrribuced co Eddie Condon by Whimey Ballien in 
American Musicians (New York, 1986), p. 5. Condon is supposed to have said rhis 
after Hugues Panassies abortive attempt co produce what he thought che righ' kind 
of jazz music on some recordings he organized for che RCA Victor (Bluebird) fabel 
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arounJ t<n r.uu_,,I(' \\.)' C\lnCemnJ \\"lth tfk. J1rc: ... ttltn Amc:n ... in J.i:: \\,\:; takmg 
and he: h\� ll' -.ct th1� n�ht h· comin,i: ll\ ...\mcnc,1 .mJ arr.m�nl! rn,lrJ1� 
� "n ... 
-: The: remark b aunbutl!\l b\ fnednch \X'abmann. Stt \T'wgmsurn .mJ w \ ·lt'llllc.I 
Crrdt. c"'""-'Nlll\ n� rcconJe<l b., \X'abmnnn (Bl..teh••cll, 1979). The "'�'lnal 
Germ4tn 1, •\'('a-. !·di man denn den Amcnk:lnem gcbenn� Etwa un�rt' h.1ln:n�n1hl.' 
Kulcur! Die Amenk.aner haben rn.x:h L:eine Kulrur. Aber n)n uru habcn 'le ni.:-ht:-. 
:u lemen: �-c \t'm�et\Sttm unJ Jn w·� Kms (Blockwcll. 1967) 
" �fr ama1eur' hbtl1ncal observaOorb ov.e 3 great Jcal ll.) Afoxandcr �:-<,n .. lt-. • mJ 
ow rcmarb on 1hc: �t)·I� of \"anous movies ov.e much ro &�nske anJ also t\l 
Manan Keane. �e1rher of those people would . ubscnbe co what I s..·w. hut �'th 
\\TOught 1mpro,·ement m mv sketch. Scsonske hn.s msisted that 1f I could rtmlwc: 
my chronological and regional bhndet!>. althouf?h I might nuiintam nw Je�riruon of 
the rrans(omrnuon <)f senstbilit)'. 1 would have 10 �t rhc dace at leas1 tl JccaJe 
earlier. I dunk he IS nght, and that the first \'1.'f)' v.1de general sen�· of mO\'tChlS·an 
wa� somulaceJ l:w the halaan neo-Realisc and Japanese movie that bej?an l\l ·'Pf'l.'•U 
m Amenca JUSt afo:r the war. But I cannot speak dtrectly for that exrcnencc. anJ 
so I am telling the smf)· of Bergman and the French New Wave. rhe �umulu:. for a 
pan of my gcnerauon. 
This 1s a mark of a genuine fonn. A work so locaied then posscsse. a kmJ of 
autonomou:. mtegrit)•. ThlS doci. n(>t assure H!> . uccc�. but 11 reserves to the W(lrk 
che dictanon of che cem1s upon which it will �uccee<l Clr f:ul. To reg•H'd a work m 
chis wny is co rrcat 1t like a sxrson-something which may prove likable or 
dJSgusring. wonderful or dre�dful, but which Joe� not before rhe fuct rl>qu1re your 
sancuon for its bcmg. 
Eric Rohmer. "Rediscovering Amenca," m Cahk'TS 54. Chnsm1as, 1955. p. 88. 
This conversion 1s one W3)' in which the sense o( a funn or genu� or mcJ1um 
develops. It is the mark that che auditor takes works scnously a:. bcmg m the 
medium, cakes them on their own terms. 
ll' Stanley Cavcll, The World Viewed (New York. 1971), pp. 5-6. 
11 J.L Austin, .. A Plea for Excuses," m Plulosoplucal Papers (Oxford, 1961),  pp. 182-183. 
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